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AN EMPIRICAL FORMULATION
OF THE MODEL
In the previous chapters, I have developed a framework that can be
employed to predict the effects of certain variables on the demand for
health and medical care. To test the implications of this framework, it is
necessary to estimate demand curves for health and medical care and
perhaps a gross investment production function as well. In the first
section of this chapter, I explore the estimation of this set of equations in
detail. In particular, I outline the structure and reduced form of the pure
investment model. Although the formulation is oriented toward the
investment framework, I offer two tests to distinguish the investment
model from the consumption model. In the second section, I describe the
measures of health used in the empirical analysis, discuss the data source
from which these measures are obtained, and comment on the independent
variables that enter the multiple regression estimates of the system.
The estimation of the investment model rather than the consumption
model is stressed because the former model generates powerful predictions
from simple analysis and innocuous assumptions. For example, if one
uses the investment framework, then he does not have to know whether
the production of health is relatively time-intensive to predict the effect
of an increase in the wage rate on the demand for health. Again, he does
not have to know whether shifts in education are commodity-neutral to
assess the sign of the correlation between health and schooling. Moreover,
the responsiveness of the quantity of health demanded to changes in its
shadow price and the behavior of gross investment depend essentially
on a single parameter—the elasticity of the MEC schedule. In the con-
sumption model, on the other hand, three parameters are relevant—the
own price elasticity of health, the elasticity of substitution between
present and future health, and the wealth elasticity.
1. STRUCTURE AND REDUCED FORM
To derive estimating equations for the pure investment model, begin with
the production function of healthy days utilized in Chapter II:
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Although the subscript i refers to age, it should be clear that H will vary
across as well as over the life cycle of a given individual. It has
already been shown1 that this production function generates the constant
elasticity MEC schedule2
ln=InBC —(C+ 1) In H + in —inice,
where e =1/(1+ C). Solving the last equation for In H. and substituting
r —+ (5.forone obtains the stock of health demand function
ln H,B' + e in W1 —in it. —dn(r—+ (4-2)
where B' =InBC/(1 + C). Suppose 1t, is positive and constant and the
real-own rate of interest is equal to zero. Then equation (4-1) would
reduce to
lnH1B' + cm —cm;—clnô1. (4-3)
Although age and education do not appear explicitly on the right-
side of (4-3), they are implicit in this equation because the rate of
depreciation and the marginal cost of gross investment are not directly
observable and expressions for them must be developed. It has been
hypothesized that depreciation rates rise with age, at least after some
stage in the life cycle, and vary among individuals of the same age as well.
Let these factors be summarized by a depreciation rate equation of the
form
1nö1 =1nô0+ (4-4)
An equation for marginal cost can be developed from the household
production function for gross investment. For analytical convenience,
assume the production function is a member of the Cobb—Douglas class:
ln I, =rHE+inM, + (1 —ln TH1. (4-5)
Here=1—Kis the share of medical care in the total cost of gross
investment or the elasticity of gross investment with respect to medical
care. With this production function, the elasticity of substitution between
medical services and own time equals one. Consequently, K is independent
of the prices of these inputs.
See Chapter II, footnote 11.
2Continuoustime equilibrium conditions are utilized in this chapter. Hence,=
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Appendix D, Section 1, demonstrates that equations (4-3) and (4-4)
generate the following reduced form demand curves for health and
medical care
in H, =(1—K)ein Wj —ln P + — — ein (4-6)
in M1 =[(1— + K] In W, —[(1—K)s+ K] in P + — 1)E
+ —+ (1 —in+ in (1 + (4-7)
A demand curve for the time spent producing health could also be
developed, but data pertaining to this input are, in general, not available.
Equations (4-2) and (4-5) may be termed the basic structural relations of
the investment model, while equations (4-6) and (4-7) are the ones that
will be actually estimated to test the implications of the model. At this
point, a number of comments concerning these latter two equations are
in order.
If the absolute value of the percentage rate of net disinvestment were
small relative to the rate of depreciation, the last term in (4-7) could be
ignored.4 Then (4-6) and (4-7) would express the two main endogenous
variables in the system as functions of four variables that are treated as
exogenous within the context of this model—the wage rate, the price of
medical care, the stock of human capital, and age—and one variable
that is unobserved, the rate of depreciation in the initial period. If P, the
price of medical care, did not vary across the relevant units of observation,
the estimating equations would become
lnH1=BW1nW+BEE+BIi+ U1 (4-6')
in M. =BWM inW + BEME+BIMi+U2, (4-7')
where=s(1—K),etc., U1 =—sInand U2 =(1—s)ln The
investment model predicts B <0, and BWM>0. In
addition, if< 1, BEM<0,and B.M> 0.
The variables U1 and U2 represent disturbance terms in the reduced
form equations. These terms are present because depreciation rates vary
among individuals of the same age, and such variations cannot be
measured empirically. Provided in ö0 were not correlated with the
independent variables in (4-6') and (4-7'), U1 and U2 would not be
Equations (4-5),(4-6), and(4-7) do not contain intercepts because all variables are
expressed as deviations from their respective means.
II indicated that if the stock of health falls over the life cycle, then the rate
of depreciation must exceed the absolute value of the rate of net disinvestment. From equation
(4-6),= <0.If fi, is small relative to approaches zero.42 .TheDemand for Health
correlated with these variables. Therefore, the equations could be esti-
mated by ordinary least squares.
The assumption that the real-own rate of. interest equals zero can be
justified along the following lines. A common empirical observation is
that wage rates rise with age, at least during most stages of the life cycle.
If W1 were growing at a constant rate i.1ç then=KIT',all i. So the
assumption implies r= KBy eliminating the real rate of interest and
postulating that flis small relative toIn H, and in M1 are made
linear functions of age. If r—exceeded zero but k1/51 were small, then
= = —sje.
Sincethe curves relating in H, and ln M. to age would be concave to the
origin in this situation, the square of age might be included as an addi-
tional explanatory variable. This variable should have negative coeffi-
cients in the demand curves for health and medical care.
One could change the form of the gross investment production
function without altering any of the parameters in (4-6) and (4-7) except
the wage elasticity of medical care. For example, suppose medical care
and own time were employed in fixed proportions. Then the elasticity
of substitution between these two inputs would equal zero, and the wage
elasticities of health and medical care would be equal.
There are two empirical procedures for assessing whether the invest-
ment model gives a more adequate representation of people's behavior
than the consumption model. In the first place, the wage rate would have a
positive effect on the demand for health in the investment model as long
as K were less than one. On the other hand, it would have a positive effect
in the consumption model only if health were relatively goods-intensive
(K <K),a somewhat more restrictive requirement. So if the computed
wage elasticity turns out to be positive, then the larger its value the more
likely it is that the investment model is preferable to the consumption
model. Of course, provided the production of health were relatively time-
intensive, the wage elasticity would be negative in the consumption model.
In this case, a positive and statistically significant estimate ofwould
lead to a rejection of the consumption model.
In the second place, suppose the rate of interest does not depend on
wealth. Then health would have a zero wealth elasticity in the investmentw-W
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model. It would, however, have a positive wealth elasticity in the con-
sumption model if it is a superior commodity. This suggests that In R, the
logarithm of full wealth, should be added to the set of independent
variables in the demand curves for health and medical care so that these
equations would become
ln H4 =BRin R +In W + BEE + B1i + U1 (4-6")
in M, =BRMIn R + BWM In W + BEME +B1M1 + U2.(4-7")
Computed wealth elasticities of H and M that do not differ significantly
from zero would tend to support the investment model. Although the
investment framework could rationalize positive wealth elasticities in
terms of a negative correlation between R and r,5 this correlation is not
likely to be very large. Regardless of the size of the correlation between R
and r, the wealth effect would be small if the share of depreciation in the
cost of health capital were relatively large.6
In addition to fitting equations (4-6") and (4-7") to the data, the gross
investment function given by equation (4-5) might also be estimated. By
estimating the production function, the hypothesis that the more educated
are more efficient producers of health could be tested directly. Note that the
production function contains two variables for which no data exist—gross
investment and the own time input. But since in=InH, + ln (R1 +
and since has been assumed to be small, one could fit7
lnH1 = + rHE —— lnô0. (4-8)
The trouble with the above procedure is that it requires a good
estimate of the gross investment production function. Unfortunately,
equation (4-8) cannot be fitted by ordinary least squares because in M1
and inthe disturbance term, are bound to be correlated. It is clear from
the demand curve for medical care that
Coy (in M1, in ô0) =(1— in
In addition, the real rate of interest would have to be positive.
Health would also have a positive wealth elasticity in the investment model for people
who are not in the labor force. For such individuals, an increase in wealth would raise the
ratio of market goods to consumption time, the marginal productivity of consumption time,
and its shadow price. Hence, the monetary rate of return on an investment in health would
increase. Since the empirical work in the next section is limited to members of the labor
force, a pure increase in wealth would not change the shadow price of their time.
If factor prices do not vary as more and more health is produced, a 1 percent increase
in medical care would be accompanied by an equal percentage increase in own time. There-
fore, the regression coefficientin equation (4-7) would reflect the elasticity of gross invest-
ment or health capital with respect to both inputs. Given constant returns to scale, the true
value ofshould be unity.44 The Demand for Health
where Coy means covariance and a2 in ö0 is the variance of in So,
given< 1, inand in ö0 would be positively correlated. Since an
increase in the rate of depreciation decreases the quantity of health capital
demanded, the coefficient of medical care would be biased downward. If
wealth were included in the set of exogenous variables, the production
function would be "overidentified" and could be fitted by two-stage least
squares.8 Using this technique, one would first estimate the demand
curve for medical care. He would then compute the predicted values of
in M, which by definition are not correlated with inFinally,he would
use these predicted values to estimate the production function.
While the two-stage least squares technique is employed in the next
chapter, there are a number of difficulties with it and major reliance is
placed on the calculations of the reduced form. These difficulties are
discussed when the production function estimates are presented. A
production function taken by itself tells nothing about producer or
consumer behavior, although it does have implications for behavior,
which operate on the demand curves for health and medical care. Thus,
they serve to rationalize the forces at work in the reduced form and give
the variables that enter the equations economic significance. Because the
reduced form parameters can be used to explain consumer choices and
because they can be obtained by conventional statistical techniques, their
interpretation should be pushed as far as possible. Only then should one
resort to a direct estimate of the production function.
• 2. MEASUREMENT OF HEALTH AND
VARIABLES CONSIDERED
The equations formulated in Section 1 have been fitted to data contained
in the 1963 health interview survey conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center and the Center for Health Administration Studies of the
University of Chicago. The NORC sample is an area probability sample
of the, civilian noninstitutionalized population in which each family had
the same probability of inclusion. Data were obtained from 2,367 families
containing 7,803 persons.9
The production function is overidentified because the number of variables excluded
from it (RandW)exceedsthe number of endogenous variables in the system (HandM)
less one by a factor of one. If wealth were not an endogenous variable, the number of excluded
variables would equal the number of endogenous variables less one. In this situation, the
production function would be "exactly identified" and could still be estimated by two-stage
least squares.
For a complete description of the sample, see Ronald Andersen and Odin W. Anderson,
ADecade of Health Services: Social Survey Trends in Use and Expenditure, Chicago,1967.An Empirical Formulation of the Model 45
Thestock of health, like the stock of knowledge, is a theoretical
concept, one that is difficult to quantify empirically. On the other hand,
the healthy time output produced by health capital can be measured in a
straightforward fashion. If TL, is time (in days) lost from market and non-
market activities due to illness and injury, then h, =365—TL1.Therefore,
consider the results that would be obtained if healthy time or its comple-
ment served as the dependent variable in the demand curve. The produc-
tion function of healthy days given by equation (4-1) implies
—lnB+C1nH1. (4-9)
Substitution of equation (4-6) for ln H, yields'°
—In TL1 =CBR mR+ C(1 — In+ — —CEIn
(4-10)
While equation (4-6) gives a demand curve for the stock of health,
equation (4-10) gives a demand curve for the flow of services yielded by
health capital. The flow coefficients can be estimated by regressing the
negative of the natural logarithm of sick time on the relevant set of
exogenous variables. The coefficients obtained would exceed, equal, or
fall short of the corresponding coefficients in the stock demand curve as
C exceeds, equals, or falls short of 1. The formulation of the flow demand
curve suggests that —ln TL1, and not lnh,, should be the dependent
variable. Consequently, the increase in healthy time for a one unit increase
in educationfalls as education increases.11 Thus, although education has
an increasing marginal product in the gross investment production
function, the model still implies diminishing returns to this variable in
terms of its impact on healthy time.
Two variants of sick time are available in the NORC sample. These
are the number of restricted-activity days reported by persons in 1963
and the number of work-loss days. A restricted-activity day (RAD) is a
day on which a person is kept away from his usual activities because of
'° derivationof (4-10) assumes that wealth is one of the independent variables in
(4-6). In addition, all variables are expressed as deviations from their respective means.
Let= CrHe. Thenfrom equation (4-10),
tTh
and
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illness or injury. A work-loss day (WLD) is a day on which a person
would have gone to work but instead lost the entire day because of illness
or injury. Work-loss days are, of course, relevant only for members of
the labor force. For such individuals, every WLD is an RAD, but the
converse is not true. This follows because an RAD might occur on a
Saturday, Sunday, holiday, or vacation day or because an individual
might go to work even though he does not feel well but might cut down
on his nonmarket activities.
Although RAD is a more encompassing measure of sick time than
WLD, both variables have been employed because it seems likely that
the latter is a more objective concept than the former. In other words,
respondents can probably recall and identify WLD with more precision
than they can recall and identify RAD. To compare the results obtained
with the two measures, only members of the labor force are included in•
the regressions computed with the NORC sample. The labor force
consists of all people who reported their current status on the date the
sample was taken (early 1964) as working full time, working part time,
or unemployed. People who fell into one of these three categories but
who failed to report the number of weeks they worked in 1963 or who
said they worked no weeks in that year were excluded from the regressions.
At this point, it will be useful to discuss four methodological issues
that arise when the complement of sick days, and especially when the
complement of WLD, is used as a measure of the services yielded by the
stock of health. First, part of the variation in WLD might simply reflect
variations in weeks worked among individuals. To cite a rather extreme
example, someone who worked only one week in 1963 might have reported
many fewer work-loss days than someone who worked fifty weeks. If
weeks worked were correlated with some of the independent variables
in (4-10), the estimates of the parameters of this equation would be biased.
To take account of this problem, WLD is adjusted for variations in
weeks worked (WW).'2 Adjusted WLD is given by'3
WLD1 —(52/WW)(WLD).
Second, sick time should not be confused with the time input in the
gross investment function. In Chapter II, I pointed out that in the absence
12Weeksworked are defined as weeks actually worked plus paid vacation time plus
work-loss weeks.
13Thecorrelation coefficient between unadjusted and adjusted work-loss is.97.
Regression coefficients obtained with unadjusted work-loss as the dependent variable (not
shown) are very similar to the coefficients presented in the next chapter.,
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of variations in depreciation rates, these two variables would be negatively
correlated. I also demonstrated that if depreciation rates did vary, the
correlation might well be positive. But providedwere independent of
the exogenous variables in (4-10), the coefficients of this equation could
be interpreted in the manner that has been suggested.'4
A third methodological issue arises if consumers face a probability
distribution of depreciation rates in each period of their lives. As stated
in Chapter II, individuals who insure against this uncertainty in part by
acquiring market insurance would have smaller stocks of health and
more sick days than those who rely solely on self-insurance. The latter
group protect themselves against potential losses by holding excess stocks
in relatively desirable states of the world—excess in the sense that the
marginal efficiency of health capital might be extremely small and even
zero in some cases. To standardize for the effects of uncertainty, a variable
that indicates the presence or absence of disability insurance (insurance
• that finances earnings lost due to illness or injury) is included in some of
the regressions run. This insurance variable might be related to observed
sick time not only because of its effect on potential losses but also because
of its effect on the probability that a given loss will occur. The theory of
"moral hazard" suggests that if the insurance premium paid by an
individual is fixed, then he may have an incentive to increase his probability
of loss.'5
Finally, some investigators have argued that the number of work-loss
• days reported by a person is determined almost entirely by the presence
or absence of disability insurance and informal sick leave arrangements.
These investigators claim that to a large extent, measured work-loss is
simply one component of "leisure time." Hence, this variable is an un-
reliable indicator of the health status of individuals.'6
For the contrary view, see Morris Silver, "An Economic Analysis of Variations in
Medical Expenses and Work-Loss Rates," in Herbert E. Kiarman (ed.), EmpiricalStudies
in Health Economics, Baltimore,1970, and reprinted as Chapter 6 in Victor R. Fuchs (ed.),
Essaysin the Economics of Health and Medical Care, NewYork, NBER, 1972. Part of Silver's
analysis is based on the assumption that sick time and the time input are identical. Suppose
c50 were correlated with some of the independent variables that Silver and I use in our regres-
sions. Then his view that the two types of time are equivalent would be partially correct,
my view that they are different would also be partially correct, and the truth would lie
somewhere between these two extremes. The empirical results in the next chapter seem
to indicate, however, that my assumption concerning sick time is very plausible.
'3 See Isaac Ehrlich and Gary S. Becker, "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and Self-
Protection,"Journalof Political Economy, 80,No. 4 (July/August 1972).
lb For a summary of this argument, see Philip E. Enterline, "Sick Absences in Certain
Western Countries," IndustrialMedicine and Surgery, 33,No. 10 (October 1964).48 The Demand for Health
The NORC data tends to contradict this view since the observed
correlation between medical care and sick time is positive and very
significant. The correlation between M and WLD1 is .356 and the corre-
lation between M and RAD is .409. These correlations reflect the positive
relationship between medical care and the depreciation rate. Apparently,
this relationship is so strong that it swamps the positive effect of an increase
in medical care on health (or the negative effect on sick time) that would
be observed if the depreciation rate were held constant. These correlations
substantiate the common-sense point of view that illness and utilization
of medical services are positively associated. They also indicate that the
number of work-loss days reported by the members of the sample
measures their illness levels rather than a fraction of their leisure time.
The dependent variable in the demand curve for medical care is
personal medical outlays. Medical expenditures include outlays on doctors,
dentists, hospital care, prescribed and nonprescribed drugs, nonmedical
practitioners, and other medical care—chiefly appliances like eyeglasses.
Expenditures exclude health insurance premiums but contain benefits
paid for by insurance.
Dollar outlays are a more desirable measure of medical care than
quantity indexes for two reasons. First, the former allows one to combine
the various components of medical care into an aggregate index of the
utilization of this care in a simple way. Second, part of the variation in
price across individuals reflects variations in the quality of services
purchased instead of true differences in the price of standard units of
service. If these variations in quality were ignored, the true quantity of
medical services would not be accurately measured. Of course, the price
of standard units of service would not be constant if, as has frequently
been alleged, doctors either discriminate in price according to wealth or
derive psychic benefits from treating the poor. Given this type of variation,
outlays would be positively correlated with price and hence would over-
state the quantity of services purchased provided the elasticity of the
MEC schedule were less than unity. But note that there is a factor at
work that tends to counteract the effect of price discrimination. Since the
average federal income tax rate rises with income, the value of tax deduc-
tions allowed for medical expenditures is greater for wealthier individuals.
The price of medical care might also vary across consumers because
of the existence of health insurance. This would be the case if an individual's
premium depended not on the size of his potential loss (medical outlays)
in unfavorable states of the world and on. his probability of incurring the
loss but on the expected outlays and expected probability of a large groupAn Empirical Formulation of the Model 49
of persons. In this situation, the relevant price would be cP,.where c is the
fraction of medical expenditures not financed by insurance. If c were
correlated with the independent variables in the demand curves for health
and medical care, their coefficients would be biased. These biases would
be mitigated to the exteut that c does not vary greatly or to the extent
that premiums are not entirely fixed.
Although the stock of health is difficult to define and measure
empirically, a proxy for it is available in the NORC sample. Persons in
the sample were asked whether their health status was, in general, poor,
fair, good, or excellent. Their response to this question is utilized as an
index of the amount of health capital they possess. This measure of H
suffers from the defect that it depends on an individual's subjective
evaluation of the state of his health: what one person considers to be
excellent health may be viewed as good or only fair health by another.
Moreover, it is not obvious how to quantify the four possible responses.
That is, one must determine exactly how much more health capital a
person in, say, excellent health has compared to someone in poor health.
Nothing can be done about the subjective nature of the health status
variable, but it is possible to construct a particular scaling scheme. The
procedure employed is based on two propositions. First, since the units
of health capital are unknown, it seems reasonable to view the four
quantities assigned to health status as measures of H in index number form.
Thus, if H =1for people whose health status is poor, the three other
quantities would express a person's stock relative to the stock. of those
in poor health. Second, the observed gross correlation between medical
outlays and sick time is positive. It has already been indicated that this
correlation reflects the positive relationship between medical care and the
depreciation rate.
Using the second proposition, assume that the gross relation between
the stock of health and medical expenditures is
H=aM_",aandb>O (4-11)
and let MF, MG, and ME be mean outlays by people in poor, fair,
good, and excellent health. Then to express the stock of health in index
number form with=1,write HF/HP =(Mp/MF)b,etc. In the NORC
sample, Mp/MF =1.7,MP/MG =2.3,MP/ME = Thus, the health
capital series is 1, 1.7, 2.3, and 5.0. It should be clear that a multiplicative
17Theseratios pertain to whites in the labor force who reported positive sick time.
See the end of this section and the beginning of Chapter V, Section 1, for the reasons why
this group was used.50 TheDemand for Health
relation between H and M was selected to free the computed health
series of units.18
Since the numerical magnitudes of health capital depend on medical
expenditures, one might think at first that the coefficients of the stock
demand curve would be related to those of the medical care demand curve.
For example, if BXM were the coefficient of variable X in the medical
care demand curve, then equation (4-11) would seem to imply that the
regression coefficient of in H on X would be —bBXM.Thisanalysis,
however, is not correct because equation (4-11) is not applied to individual
observations. Instead, it is used to construct four quantities of H from
data grouped by health status. Hence, the only purpose of this equation
is to derive a health series in which increases in the stock of health reflect
improvements in health status.'9 To emphasize this point and to show
the effect of selecting different values for health status, two other sets of
scales are employed in some of the regressions run in the next chapter
These are 1 =poor,2 =fair,3 =good,4 =excellent;and 0 =poor,
206 =fair,290 =good,411 =excellent.The first is an arbitrary set that
has no relation to medical expenditures. The second is based on the
differences betweenand the outlays of those in the other three groups
instead of on the ratios.
The remainder of this section discusses the independent variables
that enter the demand curves for health and medical care. Age is simply
given by the age of the individual. Education is the number of years of
formal schooling completed by the head of the household. That is, if
two or more members of a family are in the labor force, E is the same for
each one. Since the head of the household is in most cases the husband,
E is more accurately measured for males. Therefore, at one point in the
empirical analysis, separate regressions are run for males and females.
Moreover, to test the hypothesis that females might be more efficient
producers of health than males (or vice versa), a sex dummy (1 =female)
is included in all regressions computed with persons of both sexes.
18Ifa linear relationship were used, then H =a—bM,and Hf —= —MF),
etc.This series would not be free of units. also that the dependent variable in the stock
demand curve should be In HJ/HP (j =F,G, E). Therefore, the use of in as the
dependent variable would generate coefficients that would exceed, equal, or fail short of
the true coefficients as b exceeds, equals, or falls short of 1. But because b is a constant, the
t ratios associated with these coefficients would be unaffected.
19Forsome empiricai evidence that the estimated regression coefficients in the demand
curve for health capital are not Linear transformations of the regression coefficients in the
demand curve for medical care, see Chapter V, Tables 1 and 3.An Empirical Formulation of the Model 51
A difficulty arises when. education is used to measure human capital.
The stock of human capital possessed by a person who has completed
his formal education is not constant over the remainder of his life cycle.
Instead, it tends to increase at first due to on-the-job training and then
decrease due to depreciation. To the extent that age is correlated with
human capital, its regression coefficient might reflect forces other than
the depreciation rate. But since this correlation is positive during the
early stages of the life cycle and negative during the later stages, its net
effect on the age coefficient is not clear.
The wage rate variable is defined as follows. Let EA be actual earnings
reported by a person and N be net earnings lost due to work-loss (gross
earning lost minus disability insurance payments). Then W =(52/WW)
(EA + N). Put differently, the relevant wage rate variable is the full-time
annual equivalent of the weekly wage rate adjusted for variations in net
earnings lost per work-loss week.2°
The weekly wage can be written as
W_ EA WW*N WLW
where WW* is the number of weeks actually worked, WLW is the number
of work-loss weeks, and W W =W+ WL W. Note that if the weekly
wage were not adjusted for variations in net earnings lost per work-loss
week, a spurious negative relation would be created between the wage
and sick time with the causality running from sick time to the wage
instead of the other way around. This would occur if the wage were
measured by EA/WW. In theory, the most desirable wage variable is the
hourly wage rate, but unfortunately, hours of work per week were not
available. To the extent that people with higher stocks of health work
more hours per week than those with lower stocks, the causal relationship
that goes fromhealth to the wage has not been entirely eliminated. Note
also that with all other variables held constant, a reduction in net earnings
lost per work-loss week, N/WLW, would reduce W/52. Hence, the actual
wage rate used in the regression analysis takes some account of the effect
of informal sick leave arrangements and disability insurance on the value
of the marginal product of health capital.21
20SinceIn W is the dependent variable in allregressions,its coefficient would be the
same whetheror not the weekly wage rate were multiplied by 52.
21Amore complete discussion of this point appears in the last subsection of Chapter V.
Section 1. There I indicate why it would be inappropriate to use N/WLW as an index of
the benefits from reducing sick time.52 TheDemand for Health
As in most cross-sectional studies, the NORC sample contains data
on income but not wealth. Hence, the former is used as a proxy variable
for the latter. Regardless of whether wealth or income measures a person's
command over real resources, since a family pools its resources, family
wealth or family income (Y) is the appropriate variable to enter in the
demand functions.22 This follows even though the dependent variables—
H, WLDI, RAD, and M—pertain to a particular individual in a given
family.
To free family income of transitory components associated with
variations in weeks worked and net earnings lost, it must be adjusted in
the manner that is employed to adjust earnings. Certain difficulties arise
here because the number of wage earners is not the same in every family.
Since labor force participation of married women is inversely related to
husband's income, families with one wage earner might have more full
income (defined as full potential family earnings plus family property
income) but less reported income than families with two wage earners.
To deal with this problem, four concepts of family income are utilized:
Yl, Y2, Y3, and Y4. The first two income variables are partially adjusted
for variations in weeks worked, the third is fully adjusted, and the fourth
is unadjusted. These variables are defined as follows. Let V be family
property income, n be the number of members in a given family who are
in the labor force, and the subscript 1 identify the member of the family
who worked the most number of weeks in 1963. Then
Yl =V+ (52/WW1)(EA1 + N1)
Y2= Yl + +
Y3 =V+ > +
Y4 =V+(EAJ + Ni).
Obviously, Yl =Y2=Y3for families with only one wage earner. In
addition, note that Y4 does take account of net earnings lost by all family
members.
The variables just described place an upper and lower limit on
potential family income. The upper limit is given by Y3, the lower limit
22AsI point out later, family income per capita might be used. In any case, one would
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byYl or Y4, and a value that lies between these two extremes by Y2.23
Hopefully, the income elasticities computed with these four variables will
bracket the true parameter.24
The regression equations fitted to the NORC data contain family
income, an individual's weekly wage rate, and his level of education as
independent variables. Since Y, W, and E are all positively correlated,
one might be puzzled at first by the interpretation to be given to the
procedure of parceling out the separate effects of each via the multiple
regression technique. Variations in property income could explain why
two people with different full-time earnings have the same income. But
how could two persons with the same amount of education have different
wage rates when it is by this time well-accepted that an increase in education
raises market productivity? Robert Michael has considered this question
and has concluded that there are a variety of possible answers: "different
relative degrees of labor shortage or abundance in different occupations,
different degrees of monopoly power or of union strength, different innate
ability,...differentamounts of on-the-job training.. .orother forms of
• human capital, [and] luck."25 Thus, it is possible at a conceptual level
to raise W, Y, or E with the other two fixed. Of course, if these variables
were subject to errors of measurement, their coefficients would be biased;
the sources and directions of these biases are discussed in Appendix D,
Section 2.
The last explanatory variable in the demand functions is family size
(FS). This variable is included in the regressions for two reasons. First,
the number of children in a fami!y and the health stocks of its adult
members might be complements. This is a plausible hypothesis because
the lower the amount of sick time the more time there is available for
childrearing activities. Second, since the dependent variables pertain to
individuals and not families, per capita income might be a more appro-
priate measure of command over real resources than family income. This
is easily accomplished if family income and family size enter the regres-
sions.26
23AlthoughYl exceeds Y4 for one wage earner families, the mean of Y4 exceeds that
of Yl in the NORC sample.
24Sinceincome is used as an empirical proxy for wealth, the term income elasticity is
substituted for wealth elasticity from now on.
25The Effect ofEducationon Efficiency in Consumption, NewYork, NBER, Occasional
Paper 116,1972,p. 29.
26IfIn H = In Y/FS + BFSInFS, then In H = In Y + (B,5 —B1,,5)In FS.
Hence, the use of family income instead of per capita income ahers the coefficient of family
size alone.54 TheDemand for Health
One final comment on the regression analysis is in order. Whites
in the NORC sample reported more sick days than nonwhites, which
contradicts data in the US. National Health Survey.27 Since there were
few nonwhites in the sample, it was felt that the data for them might be
unreliable. Consequently, it was decided to restrict the analysis to whites
in the labor force. The sample size of this group is 1,770.
3. GLOSSARY
Share of medical care in total cost of gross investment or elasticity




WLD1 Work-loss days adjusted for variations in weeks worked
EAEarnings
N Net earnings lost due to work-loss
Y1, Y2,
Y3, Y4 Various measures of family income
FS Family size
27SeeGeraldine A. Gleeson and Elijah L. White, "Disability and Medical Care Among
Whites and Nonwhites in the United States," Health, Education, and Welfare Indicators
(October 1965). The U.S. National Health Survey is a continuing probability sample that
contains approximately 40,000 households. It was not used in this study because data from
it are available only at a fairly aggregate level.